

TO THE PROBLEMS OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL TEXTS

(Marginal notes to J. W. Hauer's book "Der Yoga")

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There has been a feeling lately in India that the several *darśanas* (philosophical systems), particularly Yoga, deserve a more scientific and exhaustive treatment than hitherto has been the case; notably the utterances made by Pandurang Vaman Kane¹ should be understood in this sense. His and other recent appeals for a systematic scientific investigation of the various philosophical movements of India have enjoyed, too, quite a considerable attention of scholars. In his Presidential address, Kane was able to testify that Swami Kuvalayanand prepared the critical editions of Yoga texts with concordances, i.e., the Index of Yogic Literature, a Concordance of the Yoga on the lines of Vedic Index, containing short historical articles on technical words and important topics of Yogaśāstra derived from the Upaniṣads, the Epics, the Purāṇas, the Yoga-sūtras and their commentaries, and other works on Yoga.

A publishing plan conceived on such wide lines should become standard also for editions from other Indian philosophical schools, for it is a common experience that scientific effort is more promising if supported by preliminary exegetic work, than if deprived of such support. The immensity of philosophic material, however, may require a close cooperation between Indologists, and indeed, according to C. Regamey,² there is already in existence in India a drive for publication of monographs as well as of a basic cyclopaedia of Ancient Indian thought, in whose edition both home and foreign scholars are to participate.

Under the present circumstances it still undoubtedly requires a good deal of courage to publish a book on some Indian philosophical school, not to mention a history of Indian philosophy that would lift itself from eclecticism and be more than barely descriptive. The existing works dealing with the history of Indian philosophy may be credited with having collated and summed up, to a greater or lesser extent, the present state of research done, and endeavoured to classify the vast philosophic material. We should not wonder that the philological and historical approach is in the foreground of interest. Philology and history, indeed, have always been given the task of building a more solid groundwork for future investigation; they are responsible for the pioneer work of establishing the precise wording of texts, finding their interpretation in the light of linguistic analysis, and bringing out the real purport of many a crucial, because too concisely worded, utterance. In establishing the antiquity of a doctrine or a text, or the personality of its author, it is history that cooperates with philology in finding out all about the relationship of a certain school to other schools of the same philosophic group, or to the doctrines of kindred, or even antagonistic systems. In other words, after philological interpretation and historical classification, it is the case history of each philosophical doctrine that ranks next in importance, beside the account of mutual give-and-take between individual schools.

¹ Presidential Address. Proceedings and Transactions of the All-India Oriental Conference, Thirteenth Session, Nagpur 1951, p. 104.

² Die Religionen Indiens in "Christus und die Religionen der Erde", Vol. III, Vienna 1951, p. 81.

The difficulties encountered with respect to Indian monuments and the uncertainty of their interpretation stem, of course, from one characteristic Indian thought feature, that is its lack of stress on temporality, which makes us speak of the timelessness of the Indian cultural phenomenon. Borrowing a phrase of Prof. J. L. Fischer's,³ we may also speak of its boundlessness, since at all times Indian thought has absorbed various doctrines, and each predominant doctrine engulfed lesser doctrines.

Indian way of thought is very distinctly reflected in all Indian literary monuments, including the Indian texts of philosophic nature. With the aid of philological and historical apparatus to interpret great literary creations like the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, the Mahābhārata, the Rāmāyāṇa, the Purāṇas and so on, the various currents springing from different sources, frequently very distant from one another both in time and space, can be discerned more or less reliably. In the hoary antiquity such confluent movements carried on their existence only through oral tradition, and gained or lost in strength in proportion to the interest devoted at one time or another to a definite portion of their tradition. Thus for instance, in Bhagavadgītā IV 2, 3, we find that the pristine teachings have been falling into oblivion and are being renewed. In some texts, however, the origin of a doctrine becomes entirely lost, as a result of which we fail to understand the purport of a text and grasp the reason for its incorporation. As examples of such can be cited, e.g., the Vedic texts whose lost sources have been the subject of an interesting study by J. Gonda⁴ not long ago; the latter scholar has concluded his thought-provoking paper by the following words which may apply generally as far as interpretation of a number of other Indian texts is concerned: "So in the X. maṇḍala of Ṛgveda and in certain number of hymns of the other books we possess remainders of the religious literature of other circles and groups of ancient Indian society than those brahmanical priest-families who concentrated on their hieratic matter and their own rites. And this different origin may account for at least some of the linguistic and stylistic peculiarities of the text. As early as the period in which Ṛgvedasamhitā was formed the brahmins made it their study to borrow and to bring under their control religious matter that had been the property of groups, "congregations" and individuals which they had thus far considered as outsiders."

The same principle as that put forward by Gonda may be applied to the study of a number of other texts; what is needed is to look for inclusions of elements that do not sound related to the text's objectives but whose inrush on closer examination may be shown to be consistent with the general pattern, as demonstrated so well by Gonda on the instance of the Vedic texts.

Most basic philosophical writings exhibit those terse, often obscure formulations, handed down through the channels of tradition under the form of sūtras. It is therefore possible to envisage the extent to which such a mnemotechnical frame could have preserved ancient residues, and how far their genesis can be traced. It must be borne in the mind, of course, that sūtras were merely a sort of syllabus which the teacher kept at hand when discoursing to his disciples upon a certain philosophical doctrine. This is why certain formulations recur in various texts in identical wording, which shows how the frame has been rigidly maintained.

Often, however, we find residues that do not fit into the general tone. One way towards understanding such apparently discrete parts has been shown precisely by J. Gonda through the use of the comparative qualitative method. The fallacies of this

³ Tři stupně (Three stages), Blansko 1948, p. 101—102.

⁴ The so-called secular, humorous and satirical hymns of the Ṛgveda. *Orientalia Neerlandica*, Leyden 1948, p. 348.

method have been pointed out already by M. Falk and C. Regamey.⁵ Maryla Falk warns against the risk of explaining religious or philosophical ideas by means of etymology or comparative religious science, as in many cases discrete notions are brought into connections because they are designated by the same word, or though given different names, because, the meaning of the later is held to be the same. The worst risk occurs with the so-called "influence-finding" method, involving search for the influence of some idea, of some school, upon another idea, or school, without first ensuring a firm ground for such comparisons.

The extreme case of the quantitative comparative method has been the statistical method used by H. Jacobi,⁶ involving comparison of two different texts to establish the proof that their authors were not the same persons. Jacobi believed that his statistical method was an objective one, independent of subjective viewpoints, and maintained that a mechanical comparison of the vocabularies of both of them was nothing but sufficient and decisive. As I have pointed out elsewhere,⁷ statistical figures can be far from decisive, and however objective as it may seem, the statistical method must remain purely subjective in the end. I have pointed out, too, that the proper approach to comparative work is outlined by L. Renou⁸ who demands that account be taken of the quality of both simple and compound words in the two texts undergoing comparison.

The qualitative comparative method has been made use of by M. Falk⁹ when taking the psychological myth for the basis on which to compare different myths in her attempt to establish the road from the R̥gveda till Buddhism. M. Falk lays stress on the necessity of a careful analysis of all the contexts in which a certain notion occurred in the course of its evolution, in order accurately to ascertain its significance. It is a requirement that is still given little heed, as most scientific treatises have concentrated their interest on a field that is comparatively limited, or in one direction only, or consider just one single period. It is obvious that the difficulty lies in the vastness of the material to be analysed, whose proper analysis is a matter for a special study.

A similar endeavour fills the just published book by J. W. Hauer,¹⁰ "Der Yoga," which actually for the first time presents the evolution of the Yoga doctrine and its texts from Vedic times until the Middle Ages, forming thus an addition to the author's earlier work on Yoga.¹¹ It cannot be disputed that so widely conceived a programme is certain to throw new light upon various links in the history of Yoga.

As far as methodology is concerned, Hauer was well prepared for this task, for even before¹² he never approached the investigated text without weighing carefully the

⁵ M. Falk: *Indologie auf den Wegen und Abwegen vergleichender Religionsforschung*. Polish Bulletin of Oriental Studies I, Warsaw 1937, pp. 18—37. C. Regamey, l. c., p. 81.

⁶ Über das Alter des Yogaśāstra. *Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik*, Vol. VIII, Leipzig 1931, pp. 80—88.

⁷ Two texts of Patañjali and the statistical comparison of their vocabularies. Justification of the statistical method and its limitation. *Archiv Orientální* Vol. 26, Prague 1958, pp. 88—100.

⁸ On the identity of the two Patañjalis. *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XVI, Calcutta 1940, pp. 586—591.

⁹ Il mito psicologico nell'India antica. *Memorie della R. Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Classe di scienze morali*. Vol. VIII, Roma 1939, pp. 289—738.

¹⁰ *Der Yoga. Ein indischer Weg zum Selbst. Kritisch-positive Darstellung nach den indischen Quellen mit einer Übersetzung der maßgebenden Texte*. 2. umgearbeitete und um den 2. Band erweiterte Auflage des "Yoga als Heilweg". Stuttgart 1958, p. 1—487.

¹¹ *Der Yoga als Heilweg. Nach den indischen Quellen dargestellt*. Stuttgart 1932, p. 1—159.

¹² *Der Vrātya. Untersuchungen über die nichtbrahmanische Religion Altindiens*. Stuttgart 1927, pp. 40—53.

respective assets and drawbacks of the analytic and synthetic methods. He distinguished between the analytic method, accompanied by a purely logical proof, and the synthetic one, based upon constructive imagination, scientific intuition. He stressed particularly the role of the structural whole (Gesamtbild) as a heuristic principle. This structural whole then became the point of departure, since it improved the chances of attaining due probability. The interpretation of the text continued to be valid even in case everything could not be proved on the lines of pure logic, provided, of course, that our interpretation was not refuted by some logical proof, or until another more probable structural whole was found.

Then there was ●. Strauss¹³ who even suggested the use of an experimental method to obtain a verification of the Yoga procedure. "Vor allem aber ist nicht zu vergessen", said ●. Strauss, "daß diese psychische Praxis nie aus Büchern allein vollkommen begriffen werden kann. Erlebnisse wollen nacherlebt werden, zum mindesten aber von einer Psychologie verstanden werden, wie sie Europa eben erst in Angriff genommen hat."

Against such views, of course, we cannot but quote W. Ruben¹⁴ who wrote: "Gibt es andererseits in Europa auch nur einen einzigen Indologen, der die 'Seligkeit' des Yoga oder die der Erlösung praktisch nachempfinden und aus eigener Erfahrung seinen Schülern und Lesern ans Herz legen könnte?" B. L. Atreya,¹⁵ however, thinks quite to the contrary: "What the present age needs is that the various methods of Yoga be re-tested and remodelled with the help of modern scientific and experimental methods. India can make a great contribution to the culture of the World by bringing about an alliance between Yoga and Prayoga (Experiment), which is the essential feature of modern science."

It is, indeed, an experimental method, availing itself of the physiology of higher nervous activity according to the school of I. P. Pavlov, that attempts successfully to account for the proven results of the Indian Yoga. On the whole, the works of the Soviet physiological school, particularly, those by Academician Bykov and his pupils, have contributed much valuable material in this field; Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, too, has taken up the study of para-psychological phenomena. In India itself there are several Yoga therapeutic establishments (The Yoga Institute in Bombay), and in the Indian military Academies Yoga has been introduced as a practical part of the curriculum.^{16a} In such a way practice enlightens theory, and primarily it helps to reveal the original meaning of the old philosophical writings which puzzled even their own commentators.

Prior to this all, it was Hauer^{16b} who fought out for himself the independence of investigation upon the explanations of the commentators. In his study on the fourth book of the Yoga-sūtras he shattered the time-honoured belief in the reliability of the commentators and said that it had been proved conclusively that we must avoid believing everything that the Yoga-sūtra commentators may have to say; even if we have respect for those old authorities, we must strive for an explanation of the basic text that would stand independently.

¹³ Indische Philosophie, München 1925, p. 202.

¹⁴ Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, Berlin 1954, p. 10.

¹⁵ Religion und Philosophy. Proceedings and Transactions of the All-India Oriental Conference, Madras 1941, pp. 233—254.

^{16a} See "Čtení o Sovětském svazu", № 12, pp. 55—59 in the article by Mrs. J. Sarapina "Podstata jogy". See also "Lidová demokracie" 20. VII. 1958.

^{16b} Das IV. Buch des Yogasūtra. Studia Indo-Iranica, Leipzig 1931, p. 131.

About the same time also Jwala Prasad¹⁷ said that it was a fact that in most cases the sūtras had been composed or compiled much earlier than the date of the commentators, and also, that their authors had not mentioned any particular names while criticizing a doctrine different from their own; and he concluded that this should be a warning against reposing unqualified confidence in the interpretations offered by the commentators.

If on the one hand that all clarifies the proper procedure for the interpretation of the text, on the other it restricts this procedure only to the basic text, thus allowing for the possibility of more than one interpretation of the basic text. While apparently the unreliability of commentators may lead to a greater accuracy of our interpretations, the circumstance of the basic text standing isolated opens up wide possibilities. Their plurality makes the basis for our textual interpretation still more unstable.

As for the commentators, it must be said that they sometimes find themselves rather very distant from what the basic text says, not only in time but also in different philosophic outlook. Their standpoint may reflect some contemporary philosophy, which again may represent the outcome of a centuries-old evolution. But on the other hand it must be admitted that the commentators try to give their readers an honest deal by registering the handed-down interpretations with their varieties. It is among those that the genuine interpretation of the basic text may be hidden. We can lay our hand on it by taking into account various objections to the interpretation of the basic text, registered by the commentators, whether this is done in the super-commentaries or in later commentaries, or even in the polemics roused by the advocates of other philosophies.

The commentaries may be reviewed also from the other standpoint, and that so that we do not start in the direction from the commentators to the basic text, i.e., regressively, but inversely, seeking the evolutionary lines from the more ancient period towards the basic text, i.e., proceeding progressively. Or the two ways may be combined. J. W. Hauer in his book chose this progressive methodical principle, tracing the development of Yoga from the earliest times and looking for missing links between the individual Yoga schools.

The drawback of this method is that we cannot avoid joining discrete words and ideas. On account of this H. Jacobi¹⁸ made use of the eliminative method, trying to puzzle out the original Yoga terms by comparing them with those of Sāṃkhya, Buddhism and Jainism and isolating purely Yogic notions, such as *kleśa* and the like. His attempt has been denoted by E. Frauwallner¹⁹ as entirely mistaken. Yet the existence of such attempts proves that scientific investigation should not neglect any opportunity to reach safer and firmer ground before we engage in further research, because only in this manner new light can be thrown on the problems of Indian philosophical texts.

The problems with regard to the text and the author of the Yoga-sūtras can be summed up as follows:

(1) Whether the YS text gives a unified Yoga procedure with *kaivalya* (independence) as its goal, with the author having used experiences handed-down by word of mouth, or found in older writings, or his own, which he compiled into one integral system; or,

(2) whether we can discern the various used texts or thoughts in this unified system; or,

(3) whether the YS text is loosely joined, consisting of different independent texts

¹⁷ The Date of the Yogasūtras. IRAS 1930, p. 370.

¹⁸ Über das ursprüngliche Yogasystem. Sitzungsberichte d. Preuß. Akademie d. Wissenschaft. Berlin 1929, 1930.

¹⁹ Geschichte der indischen Philosophie. Vol. I. Salzburg 1953, p. 476.

giving varied Yoga types dating from different times; or, whether the author is a single person or not; or,

(4) whether the author is Patañjali the Grammarian (2nd century B. C.), or not.

In this sense the opinions on the text, its author and the contents of the Yoga-sūtras can be divided as follows:

1. To the first group belong those Indologists who think that the text forms an indivisible whole. As to its author, we can discern two trends: (a) Indian tradition²⁰ identifies the author of the YS as Patañjali the Grammarian. The same views are held, among the Indologists,²¹ by B. Liebich, R. Garbe, Jwala Prasad. (b) Other scholars,²² such as J. H. Woods, H. Jacobi, A. B. Keith, L. Renou, L. de la Vallée-Poussin, P. Masson-Oursel, etc., make a distinction between the older Patañjali the Grammarian (2nd century B.C.) and the younger Patañjali, the author of the Yoga-sūtras (4th—5th century A.D.).

2. To the second group belongs particularly S. Dasgupta,²³ who considers only the first three books of the YS as forming a single whole whose author was Patañjali the Grammarian, while Book Four is in his opinion a later addition.

3. A third group might be formed of such scholars as think the text is not single but composed of several distinct pieces dating from different times and by different authors. To this group belongs primarily P. Deussen, J. W. Hauer, O. Strauss and E. Frauwallner.²⁴ O. Strauss²⁵ maintains that Patañjali failed to make up a completely harmonious system out of the material then at hand. He sums up the cheerless state of further research thus: "But the natural attempt to separate in our times the various aspects of this doctrine is at present and maybe for all times hopeless, since our knowledge of the pre-Patañjali Yoga is far from comprehensive enough."

As though giving an answer to Strauss, Hauer has attempted to solve this crucial problem and his solution together with criticism of his solution may help us in clarifying for us what may be a convenient method for solving also other philosophical texts. On account of this I intend to review Hauer's attempt in more detail, keeping an eye all the while upon the main task, i.e., finding a way leading to solving the problems of the texts in general.

The first edition, bearing the title "Der Yoga als Heilweg," was devoted to comprehensive criticism of the basic YS text; the second, appearing under the title "Der Yoga," dwells upon Hauer's opinion of this text more briefly but with all consequence.

Hauer is convinced that the YS text cannot be held as one-piece, calling even the commentators in testimony (the introduction to Book Two in Vācaspatimiśra). He holds

²⁰ The Commentator Bhoja, Cakrapānidatta from XIth century A.D.

²¹ B. Liebich: *Zur Einführung in die einheimische Sprachwissenschaft*, Heidelberg 1919. R. Garbe: *Sāṃkhya und Yoga, Grundrisse Vol. III*, 1896, p. 36. Jwala Prasad IRAS 1930.

²² J. H. Woods: *The Yoga-System of Patañjali*, Cambridge 1927, pp. XIII—XV. H. Jacobi l. c., pp. 581—624; *über das Alter des Yogaśāstra*, pp. 80—88. A. B. Keith: *Some Problems of Indian Philosophy*, IHQ Vol. VIII, Calcutta 1932, pp. 425—441. L. Renou: *On the Identity of the two Patañjalis*, IHQ Vol. XVI, 1940, pp. 586—591. L. de la Vallée Poussin: *Le bouddhisme et le Yoga de Patañjali. Mélanges chinois et bouddhiques*, V 1937, Bruxelles, pp. 223—242. Masson-Oursel: *Esquisse d'une histoire de la philosophie Indienne*, Paris 1923, p. 184.

²³ *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 231; *Yoga Psychology*, p. 428.

²⁴ P. Deussen: *Allg. Geschichte der Philosophie I* 3, 1922, p. 509. J. W. Hauer: *Der Yoga als Heilweg*, p. 98. O. Strauss: *Indische Philosophie*, p. 194. E. Frauwallner l. c. p. 427.

²⁵ L. c., p. 194.

that the YS text has been made up of a number of texts offering different types of Yoga, and tries to substantiate his viewpoint as well as establish the time of origin of some texts as well as the period of the last editor of the YS text.

To begin with, Hauer (p. 224) objects to the denotation and division of the chapters of the Yoga-sūtras, since e.g. *vibhūti* (perfections) are mentioned not only in Book III, but also in Book II. The term *kaivalya* (the ultimate goal of Yoga, the attainment of independence) occurs in Book IV, but actually with more detail is given in Book III. The present form of the YS is according to Hauer the result of a later editing. The editor (p. 239) proceeded to arrange the handed-down matter so, that he divided it into four books, yet he never hesitated (p. 224), when in possession of insufficient quantity of material for a chapter, to combine it with another text in order to make up for the insufficiency; or, having a text which appeared too long to him, to split it in two parts which he included in different chapters. For the inscriptions of such chapters he used prominent headwords from them which he chose so as to devote the most important pieces. The names of the chapters, given in accordance with their logical sequence by the editor, were as follows: I — *sādhana* (means); II — *vibhūti* (perfections); III — *śamādhi* (concentration); IV — *kaivalya* (isolation), while in YS their sequence is: III, I, II, IV. There follows Hauer's explanation why the editor preferred other than the logical sequence.

Before proceeding further it may well be recalled that e.g. H. Jacobi²⁶ supposed that the author of the YS text did not know well Sanskrit since he incorrectly used (I 5) the plural *ṛttayah pañcatayah* ("each stimulation is five-fold") instead of *ṛttih pañcatayī* ("there are five stimulations"). Elsewhere Jacobi²⁷ supposed that the author of the text "took" from various other systems what he deemed fit for his purpose. This only proves his bias with respect to the author of the text.

Hauer's starts from the supposition that the basic text of the YS is composed of five independent pieces, each of which contains a self-contained procedure but the goals of which are identical. They are as follows: (1) YS I 1—22 the "*nīrodha*" text (on control), (2) the "*īśvarapraṇidhāna*" text YS I 23—51 (on devotion to *īśvara*), (3) YS II 1—27 the "*kriyā-yoga*" text (on the Yoga of action), (4) YS II—28 — III 55 the "*yogāṅga*" text (on the limbs of Yoga), and (5) the "*nirmāṇacitta*" text YS IV 2—34 (on the created *citta*). The sūtra IV 1 is dismissed as an interpolation.

This dissection of the YS into five "texts" is based upon the following argumentation:

1. In Chapter One sūtras 17—21 discuss *śamādhi* = *nīrodha*, sūtras 23—40 the means for attainment of *śamādhi*, and only sūtras 41—51 deal with *śamādhi* and with *śamāpatti* identical with *śamādhi*. Hauer (p. 225) thinks that besides the lack of system this discussion shows repetition.

2. I 23 *īśvarapraṇidhānād vā* ("or by devotion to *īśvara*") refers to I 12 as a further method under *abhyāsa* (practice) and *vairāgya* (passionlessness) (p. 226). Thereby two schools in Yoga may be distinguished, one strictly theistic and one without God. If we make a distinction between these two texts of the first chapter, we can, according to Hauer, remove textual difficulties and the linguistic difference, as well as that of temper. Both texts offer a distinct and complete Yoga path and have nearly identical length. The distinctness is borne out by the objection registered with Vācaspatimiśra, why write a second chapter when the first contains a complete Yoga procedure. It must be remembered, however, that Vācaspatimiśra speaks here of the entire first chapter,

²⁶ Über d. u. Yoga-System, p. 589; Die Bhagavadgītā, Deutsche Literaturzeitung 1921.

²⁷ Über d. urspr. Yogasystem, pp. 604, 608, 615.

and does not distinguish any two texts, or better, two Yoga paths in it. The *nirodha*-text took its origin; according to Hauer, in the 1st century A.D., when Buddhist philosophy came into full bloom and when Yoga stood in opposition against overrating the cultivation of consciousness, in a period of exalted dialecticism and speculation; the other text is not very remote from the time of the first (p. 227). Their combination by the editor of the YS in the 2nd to 4th century A.D. took place because both of them held the decisive common idea, i.e., *nirodha*, which is closely connected with *samādhi* and *samāpatti*, and their relationship even led to their identification as has happened in Buddhism, with which Yoga has a common tradition.

3. The fifth "text" (Book IV) stands nearest to the first two, and gives a system of metaphysics and noetics, as already has been explained by Hauer in another study.²⁸ It came into being at a time of stepped up speculation like the "text" № 1, with which it has several terms in common (*cittavṛtti*, *svarūpa*) — p. 229, 233.

4. The third "text" (*kriyā-yoga*, II 1—27) discusses the *kleśas*; its vocabulary differs from other texts and besides being connected with brahmanism in Mahābhārata and Bhāgavata-Purāṇa (p. 235), it is an amendment or supplement to the principal text of *yogāṅga*. Hauer is confirmed about the propriety of his classification of the YS text into several independent pieces by the circumstance that in the "text" № 3 *īśvara-praṇidhāna* occurs as part of the way of Yoga, while in the second "text" it is the hub around which the other practices concentrate as mere aids, and in the fourth "text" it is only one part of one of the eight members of Yoga, which gives the reason to conclude that the theistic school becomes in these various texts gradually suppressed (p. 237).

5. The principal "text", written by the hand of Patañjali the Grammarian in the 2nd century B.C., is the fourth "text" (II 28—III 55) on *yogāṅga*. It is integral, gives systematically the whole Yoga procedure and features traces of the magic undercurrent of Yoga. It does not show any influence of Buddhism and its author stands close to Nyāya philosophy advocates. It also became model for the compilation of other texts (p. 234, 235).

6. Various Yoga movements, underlying the individual YS "texts" are ancient and therefore did not come into existence at the moment when the text was written (p. 237).

7. The ultimate editorial work on the YS took place in IVth century A.D. (p. 239).

Hauer's classification of the YS text was criticized already by Diether Lauenstein,²⁹ who was dissatisfied particularly with his splitting Book I into two "texts" and connecting sūtra I 23 with I 12. Hauer now takes up stand against his objections (p. 420). It is really a pity that Hauer disregards other Indologists' views on the YS text and does not stop to refute their conceptions of YS make-up. Thus for instance he skirts H. Jacobi's argument of the influence of Buddhism by recognizing an influence only upon the "texts" № 1, 2 and 5, whereas in the principal (№ 4) text on *yogāṅga* no such influence, in particular an influence of Vasubandhu, is manifest, which circumstance, as Hauer pointed out in the first edition,³⁰ escaped precisely Jacobi.

It would be important to show reliably that each of the five "texts" gives the complete Yoga procedure. This would involve all these "texts" giving the identical formulation of the final objective. Hauer therefore speaks of identity of *nirodha*, *samādhi*, *samāpatti*, and *kaivalya*, using as argument the meanings of those terms

²⁸ Das IV. Buch des Yogasūtra. Studia Indo-Iranica, Ehrengabe für W. Geiger, Leipzig 1931.

²⁹ Das Erwachen der Gottesmystik in Indien. München 1943.

³⁰ Der Yoga als Heilweg, p. 150.

in some Buddhist schools, yet in this he only follows the commentators whose reliability he has so thoroughly shattered. It cannot, however, be argued at the same time, that the commentators are reliable or otherwise according as they confirm our conception. But it is possible to explain in an acceptable manner why it is that the commentators deviate from the basic text.

For textual unity there are some arguments which are not refuted or even mentioned by Hauer, although they are of great moment. Thus e.g., *pāda*, as A. B. Keith³¹ justly points out, means one quarter, so that the text had four chapters, each of which forms a quarter of the whole. I have shown in one of my studies³² how manifestly in Book I most words are those used as technical terms in philosophy of cognition, in Book II they refer to the Yogic process of purification, i.e. the preliminary steps of practical magic, in Book III they deal with the magically achieved mastery over the principles of cognition and over the very basis of existence, in Book IV they reflect the process of breaking the link between the object and the subject. After all, the same fact can be seen in the names of the books given them by the author of the YS, that is, *samādhipāda*, *sādhana-pāda*, *vibhūtipāda*, *kaivalya-pāda*; the author simply selected the most fitting terms from each book and thus gave justice to that part of the Yoga procedure which is the subject-matter of the respective book, so that the objection of irrational conduct is quite mistaken. Jacobi also supposed³³ that precisely in the "text" № 4 (*yogāṅga*) a Buddhist influence is manifest, e.g. in the formulation *pariṇāmanavāda* (mutations), which Hauer passed without refutation. Frauwallner³⁴ supposed on the contrary that the *yogāṅga* text emanated from the identical basic concept as the path of salvation of Buddha, and that *nirodha-yoga* has its counterparts in the epic texts. Frauwallner goes on to discern two forms of Yoga differing substantially from one another, namely, the eight-limb path of Yoga (*yogāṅga*) in Books II and III, and the Yoga of suppression (*nirodha-yoga*) in Book I. They are conceptions that according to E. Frauwallner differ diametrically from one another. Dasgupta³⁵ holds that the first three YS books are a single whole and that their author was Patañjali; his view needs to be also taken into account.

By his view on the unsystematical and duplicated discourse on the same theme (YS I 17—21, 23—40, 41—50) Hauer stands near P. Deussen's idea³⁶ that here two congenital doctrines merged into one. I have tried, however, to show³⁷ that the sūtras that may be related to I 20 are placed quite logically within their context.

First the text mentions the *nirodha* method (I 12—16), while in I 17—51 dual *nirodha* is distinguished; the control (a) conscious, and (b) not conscious of the commotions of citta. The procedure conducive to attainment of the control not conscious is included starting with sūtra I 20, so that to *śraddhā* (belief) are related sūtras I 21—32, to *vīrya* (energy) sūtras I 33—39, to *smṛti* (memory) sūtras I 40—45, then there follow *samādhi-sabīja* I 46—47 and *prajñā* (insight) I 48—50. The continuity of the text of Book One can be thus clearly proved and it is unnecessary to look for two "texts" in it.

It is true that Vācaspati-miśra at the beginning of Book Two fails to see why write

³¹ A. B. Keith, l. c. p. 425—441.

³² Two Texts of Patañjali, Archiv Orientální, Praha 1958, 26, p. 98.

³³ Über d. u. Yogasystem, p. 621—623.

³⁴ l. c., p. 438.

³⁵ l. c., p. 231.

³⁶ l. c., I 3, p. 513, 572.

³⁷ The Meaning of pratyaya in Patañjali's Yoga-sūtras. Archiv Orientální Vol. XXV, 1957, p. 227—234.

another chapter when the entire Yoga procedure is contained in the first one. But this objection refers to the interpretation by Vyāsa (the first of the commentators), who erroneously identified some notions, thus giving the sūtras meanings not supported by the wording of the basic text. When identifying *nīrodha*, *samādhi*, *samāpatti*, Hauer refers to Śvet. Up. III 21 and Laṅkāvatārasūtra (p. 237, 228), yet this reference can be conclusive only if it can be ascertained also from the inner textual harmony to be identical. Hauer fails to give more detailed proofs. When paying heed to textual coherence we see in I 51 that the two terms *nīrodha* and *samādhi* are not identical, because *nīrodha* is a pre-requisite to *samādhi*. In III 9 and 11 *nīrodha-pariṇāma* and *samādhi-pariṇāma* are two different things. Finally, there is also distinction between *samādhi* and *kaivalya* in IV 29 and 34. With *dhāraṇā* and *dhyaṇa*, *samādhi* forms *saṁyamā* (III 4), and in this case it is not possible to identify *samādhi* with *nīrodha* or with *kaivalya*.

From the context we are even able to demonstrate the various emphasis upon intensity with *īśvarapraṇidhāna*, which occurs three times. We may assume that during the evolution of Yoga some groups probably laid more or less emphasis on this or that element of the Yoga procedure, which may be borne out, after all, by the later development, during which there appeared *bhakti*, *haṭha*, *mantra*, *karma*, *jñāna*, *rāja* etc. Yoga. Even Buddha spurned the one-sidedly exaggerated practice (asceticism and such like). And so even the author of the Yoga-sūtras recommends that method, but with varying intensity. With belief (I 29—32) this method is quite in place; in the operative Yoga (*kriyā-yoga*) it is a preliminary to the magic operation and in *yogāṅga* it is efficacious in *niyama*. Its different functional incorporation does not justify a conclusion that we can distinguish a theistic and atheistic or nihilistic Yoga, since in the older Yoga the magic, theistic and medicine-man element etc. were not yet so differentiated because everything flowed together in it. Different functional outlook may also be observed with *kaivalyam* at four places in the Yoga-sūtras, and only the final sūtra (IV 34) formulates the ultimate goal that the object has fulfilled all the purposes for the subject so that the subject-object conjunction is broken up and the subject and the object are not mutually dependent any more. Hauer (p. 184, 185) says that *kaivalya* comes from a very old tradition and that its meaning varies, e.g. in comparison with Jainism.

We are primarily interested in Hauer's notion how the author or the ultimate compiler was patching up the text from five different pieces. As though in response to his attempt, before it was even published, E. Frauwallner³⁸ said that the things are a little less simple than that. If he thinks that the texts were composed, using parts of different origin and uniting different doctrines under one roof, it must be pointed out that only rarely these doctrines remain unadulterated and in their initial form. In most cases it is possible to notice mutual influences and attempts at reconciling contradictions. Those who tried to dissect the Yoga-sūtras into their alleged constituent parts paid little heed to this. When it was recognized that the text was made up of parts and that its components were of diverse character, those scholars proceeded with their analysis as though the constituent parts had been simply mechanically added and if one wished to take them apart it sufficed to find the joints. Even if we overlook the possibility that in such cases the various components may have been the result of a long development, during which they underwent many changes prior to being fitted together, their union could not have taken place without their being re-operated and assimilated to one another in the most different ways. We could not imagine the compilers otherwise than as men to whom the diversities and contradictions of the individual

"texts" were not concealed, and whose task led them to create a real unity by eliminating all inconsistencies. This must be taken into account when undertaking real analysis. The necessity to recognize revised spots and conjecture the original shape of the various aphorisms is often difficult.

This discourse presented by Frauwallner offers new impetus towards solving the problems of the Indian philosophical texts. Undoubtedly, Yoga is very ancient and its origin is lost in very remote times, as witnessed by sporadic mentions in the oldest Indian literary monuments whose antiquity may only be guessed. But as a result of that circumstance the time of the origin of the Yoga practice and doctrine cannot be dated with any accuracy. From those remote times onward, Yoga was handed down by word of mouth, and the current of its tradition grew in size owing to the influx of various inmixtures. These new constituents, backed without doubt by personal experience, enriched the Yoga practice and theory.

If we trace, however, the development of Yoga as it is reflected in the various older monuments, we see how in all those ancient quotations there is already that concise wording. A sort of Yogic form appears already as early as the monuments of the culture of the Indus Valley, and in this respect we can agree to Hauer that there is a common tradition of Yoga, Buddhism and Jainism (p. 186). Buddha and Mahāvīra in Jainism evolved their own Yogic techniques. Finally even Hemacandra's *Yogaśāstra* displays an independence from Yoga-sūtras. Even in the *Upaniṣads* Yoga is incorporated as an efficient means supporting the line of preference, so that Yoga does not represent any affix but an organic part of the *Upaniṣadean* system, as witnessed by the existence of particular Yoga *Upaniṣads*. An independent structure is shown by Yoga also in the *Mahābhārata*; with *Sāṃkhya*, Yoga formed an indissoluble association until their differentiation. I refrain from tracing in more detail, or substantiating the fact that in the course of the entire history of Indian thought Yoga is to be held an organic component of the pattern of every single system, which, after all, follows even from Hauer's book itself.

Hence, to investigate the growth of Yoga does not mean to dissect various ancient texts in order to find crumbs of the Yoga theory, isolate a number of suitable passages out of their structural surroundings, place them side by side and look for connecting links between them. As I have already stated, in Indian thought merged, or rather were sunk various doctrines, and the prevailing doctrine engulfed other doctrines. With Yoga, however, the Yoga practice remained as the principal criterion and everybody could satisfy himself of its results, whatever the theory underlying that practice may have been. We can see it best from the commentaries and the various doctrines that incorporated the Yoga practice into their systems. We can entirely agree with A. B. Keith³⁸ when he says that the Yoga school was not distinguished by careful thought but by its Yoga practices, which remain valid, whatever metaphysical doctrines may be held.

This had the result, of course, that the commentators' interpretations do not correspond to the basic YS text, for the commentaries have already their contemporary philosophy as their starting point, and strive to squeeze the Yoga system of Patañjali into it. With the commentators' reliability shaken, the risk of each attempt at the reconstruction of the initial meaning of the Yoga-sūtras, as envisaged by their own author, is obvious.

³⁸ l. c., p. 439.

³⁹ l. c., p. 437.

When Hauer splits up the basic YS text into five different and independent pieces, he can justify it only in that sense that Patañjali could have several texts at his disposal. And it is quite possible that each of these could emphasize this or that component of the Yoga procedure, and we can even go beyond Hauer assuming that the author of the YS was able to draw from far more numerous Yoga practices accompanied by mnemotechnical aids handed down by tradition. This assumption could follow from his inclusion side by side of various equivalent and equipotent practices conducive to the attainment of the calm of citta (I 33—40), or the reference to *kleśas* when discussing *saṃskāras* (in Bk. IV to Bk. II), and last but not the least, the systematic survey of results of the Yoga procedure in *yogāṅga*.

It is therefore safer to continue assuming that Patañjali as the author of the Yoga-sūtras endeavoured to link various Yoga practices into a self-contained system, and as pointed out by Frauwallner he has not merely patched mechanically different texts together, but must have been aware of many discrepancies and contradictions existing in the latter, due to their different ages and the frequent alterations they had had to undergo before they had taken the shape they had in Patañjali's hand. The compiler's purpose and self-imposed task is quite obvious: he resolved to build a system in whose framework those various texts would be consolidated so that it could not be distinguished where one ended and another began.

Frauwallner's, together with Gonda's, and formerly also Hauer's and Falk's views have shown that a new approach to the problems occurring in the matter of Indian texts generally may still be realized. Its leading idea, of course, is not at all new but merely forgotten: what it demands from us is that we first approach our text as a rational whole. It would be wrong to assume in advance that the text in hand is or can only be an agglomerate of a number of lesser texts.

Returning to our particular theme, the Yoga-sūtras, we shall therefore, too, let ourselves be led by the governing hypothesis that every system possesses, figuratively said, its own inner logic and must exhibit structural principles determining not only its overall pattern but also its individual components. Although in the course of its development some Yoga element may have been subjected to modifications due to influence of some sort (such as *īśvarapranidhāna*), partial moments could not bear upon the whole in its entirety. I am convinced therefore that the Yoga-sūtras are an attempt to give a synthesis of the whole Yoga system. To what extent in this mnemotechnical sketch former remnants may have been preserved, and how far back their genesis may be traced, is a matter for further discussion. However, I have tried⁴⁰ to show that nothing of it can be decisive either for the account itself or its understandability, and bearing in my mind that the YS are a self-contained, closely-knit system I first proposed to determine to what extent the individual books are fitting into the general pattern.

In my previous studies⁴¹ I looked for some centralizing methodical principle, that were common to all the individual constituent parts, of which I then held that they were quite independent and did not even form a whole to the opinion of some scholars. The central idea could be found as a result of comparison of the Yoga-sūtra variant with other, more ancient Yoga trends, with Buddhism, Jainism, Sāṃkhya, the Upaniṣads and so on. But this inner unity of purpose in the Yoga-sūtras kept eluding me before I first began to visualize the Yoga system as a systematic attempt at breaking all the links fettering together the subject and the object. The linkage, or conjunction, of the

⁴⁰ The Message of Patañjali. A Re-appraisal. (Prepared for printing.)

⁴¹ The Methodical Principle in Patañjali's Yoga-sūtras. Archiv Orient. Vol. XX, Praha 1952.

subject and object, the intermingling of the latter with the former, is the groundwork for what J. L. Fischer⁴² calls the pan-plectal principle. I ventured to ask whether the Yoga-sūtras cannot be looked upon as a gradual loosening and destruction of pan-plectal bonds. And only from this angle did the entire Yogic system reveal itself to me in its rationality and compact unity. In the Yoga-sūtras Patañjali has deliberately followed the procedure aiming at breaking up the pan-plectal unity. Thus for the substantiation of my own course I could find support in the Yoga-sūtras themselves, since the YS text contains both the pan-plectal principle and the method conducive to the dissolution of the subject-object linkage.

As the pan-plectal mode of thinking, so characteristic for pristine periods, infiltrates the whole YS text, the latter can be considered as an integral unity.

The phases through which the Yoga procedure in the Yoga-sūtras runs are as follows: (1) Prevalence of the forces of the object over those of the subject; (2) a shift of these forces towards preponderance of the subject; (3) equalization of both kinds of forces; (4) dissolution of pan-plectal dependence and attainment of independence of the subject on the object. As far as further details and the relationship to pan-plectal thinking in the Vedas, the Upaniṣads, etc., are concerned, I can only refer to my book.

The great accomplishment of Hauer's effort lies indisputably in the circumstance that for such a long time he devoted his forces to unravelling the problem of the philosophy underlying the Yoga-sūtra text; that he so determinedly strove for scientifically incontestable formulations and stubbornly sought the clarification of crucial spots in the text; that in the years elapsed between the first (1932) and the present (1958) edition he never ceased to call for fresh, pioneering work in judging Indian philosophical monuments. He was well aware that the comparative, influence-finding, statistical, etc., methods may lead astray, and that without new forms of approach and new forms of work we would hardly attain that degree of safety in our conclusions that our Indian philosophical texts undoubtedly deserve.

⁴² Tři stupně, p. 91 ff.